Seven years, two per cent

On 21 October 2026 the economist Hans-Werner Sinn gave a lecture on the state of the German economy at the Institute for Swiss Economic Policy in Lucerne.^[5] Two of his findings were passed on afterwards: that since 2018 Germany has been, together with Japan, bottom of the OECD on growth, and that real production in manufacturing has fallen by 16 per cent since 2018, in the car industry by 25, in machinery by 23 and in chemicals by 22 per cent.^[4]

We recalculated both, rather than copying them. The figures below come from the databases of the International Monetary Fund^[1] and of Eurostat^[2], accessed on 26 October 2026. The result for Germany matches Sinn’s figures almost exactly. For some other countries it does not – more on that below.

Two per cent in seven years

German economic output grew by 2.0 per cent in real terms from 2018 to 2025. Not per year, but in total. Converted, that is 0.3 per cent a year. Over the same period the world economy grew by 22.8 per cent, the euro area by 8.5 per cent, the United States by 18.5 per cent.^[1] For the last year of the series the IMF and the Federal Statistical Office agree: in 2025 the German economy grew by 0.2 per cent.^[3]

The series follows the chart from the lecture in its selection of countries, not in its values. Germany stands in last place, Japan immediately before it – that corresponds to Sinn’s own formulation that Germany is bottom together with Japan.^[4] The chart itself, by contrast, shows Japan at 1.2 per cent, that is clearly above Germany. The IMF’s data do not support that value.

Why one mean is not the same as another here: in 2020 Germany had a fall of 4.0 per cent and in 2021 a rise of 4.0 per cent. Added together that gives zero; calculated properly a loss remains, because the rise works on the smaller base. We therefore use the geometric mean: the annual growth that leads from 2018 to 2025 to the level actually reached. The simple average of the seven annual rates would give Germany 0.31 rather than 0.29 per cent.

What the gap means is shown by a simple counter-calculation. Had the German economy grown since 2018 at the pace of the euro area – not at the pace of the world, the United States or Poland, but at the average of its own currency area – economic output in 2025 would be a good 6 per cent higher than it is. That is a model calculation and not a forecast; the arithmetic is set out under “How we calculated”.

Industry: Germany falls, the neighbours do not

The second finding concerns manufacturing. Here the position is clearer than for overall growth, and here it can best be tested whether Germany shares a European problem or has one of its own. Eurostat keeps the same series by the same rules for Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the EU.^[2]

The path separates two things that often run together in the debate. The slump in the coronavirus year 2020 hit all four, Switzerland least. After that Germany is the only one not to climb back: Austria, Switzerland and the EU have been above the 2018 level in every year since 2021. Germany has fallen further in every year since 2022 and in the first half of 2026 lies even below the coronavirus year 2020.

The right-hand column is the figure from the lecture.^[4] The deviations of one to two percentage points are plausibly explained by a different reference period – anyone calculating up to the end of 2025 arrives at different values from someone including the first half of 2026. The finding itself stands in all four rows.

Three neighbours, the same world situation, the same markets – and only one industry that is getting smaller.

This chart does not prove what the cause is. But it rules out one explanation that is often heard: that this is a general European development to which Germany is merely particularly exposed. The EU as a whole produces more today than in 2018, Austria as an immediate neighbour with a similar industrial structure does too, and Switzerland considerably more. Whatever the causes, they work differently in Germany from next door.

What these figures do not say

They do not say what the cause is. Demography, energy prices, regulation, export markets, tariffs and the structure of German industry are not separated out in this calculation; anyone naming a cause needs evidence of their own for it. Nor do they say anything about the future: the IMF expects growth for Germany of 1.3 per cent in 2026 and 1.1 per cent in 2027.^[1] Third, they are no verdict on living standards or prosperity – gross domestic product measures production, not quality of life, and industrial production measures quantity, not value added per employee. And fourth, they are open to revision: both the IMF series and the Eurostat index are continually revised, the value for the first half of 2026 particularly so.

What remains is a checked finding in two sentences. The German economy has grown by 2.0 per cent in seven years and thereby stands at the end of a comparison of 20 economies. Its industry produces 15 per cent less than in 2018, while its neighbours’ produces more.